

GUNDISSALINUS ON NECESSARY BEING: TEXTUAL AND DOCTRINAL ALTERATIONS IN THE EXPOSITION OF AVICENNA'S *METAPHYSICA*

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Abstract. This article examines the textual alteration strategy carried out by Dominicus Gundissalinus in his original works. One of the most striking examples of this approach can be detected in the large quotation of Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysica* I, 6–7 in Gundissalinus' cosmological treatise *De processione mundi*, in which the Spanish philosopher variously modifies the text he translated a few years before. After a short presentation of Gundissalinus' double role as translator and philosopher, the study moves on to the analysis of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine of necessary and possible being, and the five demonstrations of the unrelated uniqueness of necessary being offered by Ibn Sīnā. These arguments are directly quoted by Gundissalinus: nevertheless, the author modifies the text in many passages, here examined through the analysis of some representative excerpts. The results of this enquiry suggest that Gundissalinus is following an effective alteration strategy, envisaging at least two main purposes: the clarification of Ibn Sīnā's line of reasoning, and the doctrinal assimilation of *Metaphysica*'s theories in his original philosophical system. In appendix to this article the whole text of the two versions of *Metaphysica* I, 6–7 is presented.

Résumé. Cet article envisage la stratégie d'altération textuelle réalisée par Dominique Gundisalvi dans ses œuvres originales. Un des exemples les plus significatifs de cette stratégie peut être reconnu dans la longue citation de *Metaphysica* I, 6–7 d'Ibn Sīnā dans le traité cosmologique de Gundisalvi, le *De processione mundi*, où le philosophe espagnol modifie différemment le texte qu'il a traduit quelques années auparavant. Après une brève présentation du double rôle de Gundisalvi comme traducteur et philosophe, on analyse la doctrine de l'être nécessaire et de l'être possible d'Ibn Sīnā, et les cinq démonstrations de l'unicité sans relation de l'être nécessaire offertes par Ibn Sīnā. Ces arguments sont cités directement par Gundisalvi: l'auteur cependant modifie le texte en plusieurs passages qui sont examinés à travers l'analyse des cas les plus exemplaires. Les résultats de cette enquête nous suggèrent que Gundisalvi suit une véritable stratégie d'altération, ayant en vue deux finalités principales: la clarification de la ligne de raisonnement d'Ibn Sīnā et l'assimilation de ses théories dans le système doctrinal de Gundisalvi. En appendice à cet article on présente en entier le texte des deux variantes de *Metaphysica* I, 6–7.

Dominicus Gundissalinus (c. 1115 – post 1190) is the author of over twenty translations from Arabic into Latin, which are of considerable

importance to philosophy and science.¹ Working alone or with two collaborators² – i.e. Abraham ibn Daud³ and Johannes Hispanus⁴ – Gundissalinus translated works – such as Avicenna’s *De anima* and *Metaphysica*, al-Fārābī’s *De scientiis* or Ibn Gabirol’s *Fons vitae* – that were received with enthusiasm in the Latin world, facilitating and paving the way for the thirteenth century philosophical transition to Aristotelianism.

These translations were also used by Gundissalinus as the speculative basis for five personal philosophical works, where the author blends some of the principal results of Arabic, Jewish and Latin enquiries into a new doctrinal system quite autonomous from its sources. At first glance, these Gundissalinian treatises might be viewed as nothing more than a multiplicity of textual quotations deriving from the works that Gundissalinus translated and studied. However, upon closer inspection the author’s personal theoretical perspectives become more perspicuous: whereas on the one hand the textual proximity of Gundissalinus’ treatises to their sources is undeniable, and this counts as a typical feature of his *modus operandi*, on the other the Toledan philosopher accomplishes a real synthesis of some speculative perspectives that often not only differ from one another but are even opposites, an example of this being Avicenna’s ontology and universal hylomorphism.

Thus, the close relationship between the Gundissalinian text and its main sources allows us to understand some interesting nuances of Gundissalinus’ hermeneutics with regard to his Arabic sources, leading to deeper insight into both his philosophical thought and his translation method. In this contribution, I shall examine a prime example of

¹ For an overall account on Gundissalinus’ biography, see Nicola Polloni, “Elementi storiografici e documentali per un profilo biografico di Dominicus Gundisalvi”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 82 (2015), forthcoming.

² For the practical development of Toledan translation activity, see Marie-Thérèse D’Alverny, “Les traductions à deux interprètes, d’arabe en langue vernaculaire et de langue vernaculaire en latin”, in Geneviève Contamine (ed.), *Traduction et traducteurs au Moyen Âge*. Actes du colloque international du CNRS organisé à Paris, Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes, les 26-28 mai 1986 (Paris, 1989), pp. 193–206.

³ See Marie-Thérèse D’Alverny, “Avendauth?”, in *Homenaje a Millás-Vallicrosa* (Barcelona, 1954), vol. I, pp. 19–43; and Alexander Fidora, “Religious diversity and the philosophical translations of twelfth-century Toledo”, in Constant Mews – John Crossley (eds.), *Communities of Learning. Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1110-1500* (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 19–36.

⁴ See Charles Burnett, “Magister Iohannes Hispanus’: towards the identity of a Toledan translator”, in Georges Comet (ed.), *Comprendre et maîtriser la nature au Moyen Âge*. Mélanges d’histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan (Genève-Paris, 1994), pp. 425–36; Charles Burnett, “Magister Iohannes Hispalensis et Limiensis’ and Qusta ibn Luqa’s *De differentia spiritus et animae*: a Portuguese contribution to the arts curriculum?”, *Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos*, 7–8 (1995): 221–67; Maureen Robinson, “The heritage of medieval errors in the Latin manuscripts of Johannes Hispalensis”, *Al-Qantara*, XXVIII (2007): 41–71; and Maureen Robinson, “The history and myths surrounding Johannes Hispalensis”, *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 80 (2003): 443–70.

these textual connections, namely the Gundissalinian quotation, in his *De processione mundi*,⁵ of Avicenna's demonstrations of the necessary being.⁶ I shall focus on the main philosophical issue directly connected to the textual modifications that Gundissalinus introduces in his cosmological treatise, setting aside issues concerning the Latin rendering of the Arabic and differences between the two Gundissalinian versions of this passage and Avicenna's original text.⁷

AVICENNA'S DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE UNRELATED UNIQUENESS OF THE NECESSARY BEING

Avicenna dedicates Chapters 6 and 7 of his *Liber de philosophia prima seu Metaphysica* to the notorious discussion on the ontological difference between God and the creatures according to the theory of necessary and possible being.⁸ The first book of the *Metaphysica* presents the first concepts and main elements of Avicenna's ontology,⁹ amongst which there is the famous differentiation between essence and existence, so influential in later Latin speculations.¹⁰

The two chapters we are going to examine play a crucial theoretical role within the philosophical system and within the *Metaphysica* itself. Here, Avicenna carries out an analysis of the necessary and possible beings and demonstrates through various important logical arguments the unrelated uniqueness and unity of the necessary being, totally uncaused, self-sufficient, and on the basis of which a distinction between essence and existence is declared impossible.¹¹ The opposite equivalent in this ontological bipartition is the possible

⁵ Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, ed. Georg Bülow, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXIV, 3 (1925), 5, 15–17, 10.

⁶ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, ed. Simone van Riet (Leiden, 1983), I, 6–7, 43, 1–55, 55.

⁷ Regarding the translation methods used and the Latin rendering of the original Arabic text of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, see Jean Jolivet, “The Arabic inheritance”, in Peter Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 113–48; and Jean Jolivet, “Le vocabulaire de l'être et de la création dans la *Philosophia prima* de l'Avicenna latinus”, in Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel (eds.), *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge* (Turnhout, 2000), pp. 35–49.

⁸ For the global exposition of Avicennian ontology and the arguments on the necessary being, see: John McGinnis, *Avicenna* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 159–77; Jean Jolivet, “Aux origines de l'ontologie d'Ibn Sīnā”, in *Études sur Avicenne*, Études dirigées par Jean Jolivet et Roshdi Rashed (Paris, 1984), pp. 221–35; and Olga Lizzini, *Avicenna* (Roma, 2012), pp. 97–154.

⁹ Regarding the ontological perspectives of Avicenna and his hermeneutics of Aristotle, see Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā'* (Leiden-Boston, 2006); and Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden, 1988).

¹⁰ Cf. Heidrun Eichner, “Essence and existence. Thirteenth-century perspectives in Arabic-Islamic philosophy and theology”, in Amos Bertolacci and Nikolaus D. Hasse (eds.), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics* (Berlin-Boston, 2012), pp. 123–52.

¹¹ See Lenn E. Goodman, *Avicenna* (New York, 1992), pp. 49–120.

being, insufficient to itself, as it always requires a cause that distinguishes its possibility of being from its possibility of not-being. Once this process is actuated, the possible being becomes a necessary being. However, it is not a *necesse esse per se*, that is, in itself, but a necessary being *per aliud*, i.e. depending on a cause that discriminates between his possible not-being and being.¹² Hence Avicenna presents to the reader an ontological system in which God and the creation are clearly and totally different as regards both their causality and their being. Only God is uncaused, while being the cause of all things that follow him in the *fluxus* of being.¹³ Contrarily, the possible being, that is, the possible creation that becomes actual in the transition from its possibility to the status of *necesse esse per aliud*, always requires a cause of its being.

In these two chapters, Avicenna notably presents five arguments that demonstrate the true and unrelated uniqueness of the necessary being. As remarked by Lizzini,¹⁴ these proofs are based on a common argument: given two beings that are identical in their definitions and existing simultaneously, their relation always involves a causal action. This action will cause either (1.) the existence of both of them, and therefore the cause is external to their relationship, or (2.) the existence of one of them, so that the first being is caused and the second is its cause. Hence, in every relation between two beings, we have only two possible situations: in the first case, they are both caused by a third cause; in the second case, one is the cause and the other is the caused. Avicenna's demonstration is preceded by a short paragraph on the characteristics of the necessary being, and followed by an ending on the qualities of the possible beings. In between, there are the five arguments, among which it is possible to distinguish two classes of demonstrations: the first two arguments state the unrelatedness of the necessary being (by means of the argument of homology and the argument of the two relatives), while the last three demonstrations testify to the absolute uniqueness of that being. In summary, the demonstrations are as follows:

*First argument*¹⁵ (the “homology argument¹⁶”) – the premise of the argument is the hypothesis of the existence of two necessary beings homologous in their being and inseparable in existence, neither of

¹² Cf. Guy Jalbert, “Le nécessaire et le possible dans la philosophie d’Avicenne”, *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa*, 30 (1960): 89–101.

¹³ See Olga Lizzini, *Fluxus (fayḍ). Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica e della fisica di Avicenna* (Bari, 2011).

¹⁴ Lizzini, *Avicenna*, p. 119.

¹⁵ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 46, 72–47, 11.

¹⁶ Cf. Olga Lizzini, “The relation between form and matter”, in John McGinnis (ed.), *Interpreting Avicenna, Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam* (Paris, 2004), pp. 175–85.

which is the cause of the other. If we take one of these necessary beings (α), it will be either (a.) necessary in itself or (b.) not necessary in itself. Moreover, option (a.) entails that given that α is necessary *per se*, in relation to the existence of β we have the following options:

(aa.) β is necessary in itself as well and α may be necessary in itself and in virtue of the necessary being of β , so that α would be necessary *per se* and *per aliud*, but this is impossible; or

(ab.) being β necessary in itself, α may be necessary in itself and not through β , but if their relation were as such, there would be no way to justify their concomitance and their bond, and this goes against the premises of the analysis. Hence, the second main option (b.) is to be accepted. α is not necessary in itself, so that α is possible in itself and necessary through the intervention of β . However, this second conclusion is also false according to the premises. After thorough examination of their relationship, since the being of α entails the being of β , we reach another set of alternative options:

either (ba.) the same ontological condition of α also applies to β ; or
(bb.) α and β are not in the same ontological condition.

The latter conclusion cannot be accepted, for the premise entails that the two necessary beings are *coaequalia*, so that we should suppose that both comply with the same conditions; this would mean that both of them are possible *per se* and necessary through the intervention of the other. However, this would mean the alternative options are:

(baa.) either the possible being of β causes the necessary being of α , and then the necessary being of α causes the necessary being of β , but if it were true that the possible being of β causes the necessity of α , the being of the latter would not entail any necessity and the relation would be between a cause (β) and a caused (α); and

(bab.) or the necessary being of β causes the necessary being of α , and at the very same time the necessary being of α causes the necessary being of β . However, this latter option implies that the necessity of being of each presupposes itself, for it is both the cause of the necessary being and essentially subsequent to the same necessity of being.

Therefore, it is impossible that two necessary beings which are homologous in their being exist simultaneously.

*Second argument*¹⁷ (hypothesis of the two relatives) – the argument is based on the hypothesis of two necessary beings of which neither is the cause of the necessity of the other but their simultaneous presence causes the necessity of both their beings. It is possible, according to Avicenna, to make two different claims concerning such beings. Firstly (a.) if we consider the existence and essence of α and β on the basis of their relationship, we must choose between two options:

¹⁷ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 48, 12–38.

(aa.) the existence and essence of α and β consist of and derive from their mutual relation, but in this way they are in themselves possible beings, for their necessity depends on the other; and

(ab.) the existence and essence of α and β do not consist in their mutual relation, but if this were true, they would not be relatives if not accidentally, for their relationship would be extrinsic and added to their essence. Hence, once excluded these first options, we should admit that (b.) the relative beings under examination have the same essence. Accordingly, the relation between their essences has to be reduced to one of these eventualities, *i.e.*:

either (ba.) the essential definition of α causes the essential definition of β through the same essence of α , but in this case it is the being of α that causes that of β , and so the first is a cause and the latter is caused; or

(bb.) there is no causal bond between the essential notion of α and β , and they integrally consist of their relationship. This would mean, however, that their essence derives from an extrinsic cause, their bond is accidental, and their being is caused.

So it is impossible that two relative necessary beings exist.

*Third argument*¹⁸ (uniqueness of the definition of necessary being) – if we suppose the existence of manifold necessary beings, they will be:

(a.) in a situation where each is identical to the others in terms of their *intellectus essentiae*, and so the essential notion of α would be identical to that of β ; or

(b.) each of them is different from the others in terms of their essential notion.

But if we admit the first alternative (a.), supposing an identity of their essential notions, the being of α could not be differentiated from the being of the other through its essence, and its differentiation (and identification) would be given by an accident or unessential attribute that are inherent to its essence. But this would mean the supposed accident would be inherent to the essence of α :

(aa.) through the quiddity of α , which is identical to every other supposed necessary being, and so there would be no principle of identification; or

(ab.) through an external cause, but this would mean its individuation is derived from a cause and the necessity of both would derive from their mutual presence, and this scenario was already refuted.

Hence, it is impossible (a.) that their essential notion is identical. But at the same time, it is unacceptable that (b.) their *intellectus essentiae* is different, because in that case we face the alternative between:

(ba.) the eventuality that the essence of each one coincides with the necessity of its being, but if this were true, there would be no principle of differentiation between them; and

¹⁸ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 49, 40–51, 79.

(bb.) the eventuality that their essence is different from their necessity, but in this case the essential definition of each one would be accidental, for their necessity of being does not derive from their essence, and they would be necessary beings before the supposed acquisition of necessity, and since there would be no possibility of an essential differentiation between them, we are again confronted with the first hypothesis (a.).

*Fourth argument*¹⁹ (division of the necessary being according to the species and the individual) – the initial hypothesis is that the definition of the necessity of being can be considered as a species characteristic of many individuals. This division should happen in one of the following two ways:

(a.) through specific difference (as the genus is subdivided into species), but the species can account for the actual being and not for the definition, and for this reason it is impossible that such a difference could provide the necessary being to a thing; or

(b.) through accidents (as the species is subdivided into individuals), but as the individuals agree on their essence and are differentiated by accidents, this possibility leads back to the first alternative (a.). Hence the necessity of being cannot be constituted as a generic or specific being.

*Fifth argument*²⁰ (necessity of being as a proper characteristic of the necessary being predicable of a multiplicity of beings) – Following the assumption that the necessity of being is a proper and predicable characteristic of the necessary being, the same characteristic has to be a necessary being, and we are confronted with an alternative regarding the possession of this characteristic. If the belonging of characteristic y is necessary to the necessary being α to which it belongs, the necessity of α is true only if it possesses y , so α is possible and only y is necessary. If, however, the belonging of the characteristic y is only possible for the necessary being α , we face a contradiction, since the main characterization of the possible being is the possibility of being or not being, so the contradiction resides in the same possibility of being/not being as a characteristic of the necessary being, which is impossible. The necessity of being cannot therefore be a characteristic belonging to something. This is also true if we take the characteristic in a general sense, since:

(a.) if we consider that the characteristic y is a necessary being and a particular being, y is that particular being; and

(b.) if we admit that y is a necessary being but not a particular being, that being is particularized either (ba.) thanks to its essence, but in this way it

¹⁹ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 51, 80–52, 12.

²⁰ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 52, 13–54, 43.

is a particular being, or (bb.) thanks to an external cause, and *y* would actually be a possible being.

Having proved the unrelated uniqueness and unity of the necessary being, Avicenna can finally state that the necessary being is one in name and number, completely different from the possible being, which is always characterized by the possibility of being or not being until the necessary being causes it.²¹

THE ALTERATION STRATEGY IN GUNDISSALINUS' HERMENEUTICS OF *METAPHYSICS* I, 6–7

The *De processione mundi* is perhaps Gundissalinus' most mature philosophical work. In this text, the author examines creation from a cosmological and ontological point of view,²² describing on the one hand the different stages by means of which the world was created and on the other the ontological composition of the created being following the Gabirolian doctrine of universal hylomorphism.

The first pages of the treatise are dedicated to resolving a series of epistemological issues, directly concerning the very possibility of a theoretical investigation of the first causes. Once the conditions of possibility are clarified, Gundissalinus starts his analysis by descending from the first Cause, God, *i.e.* the necessary being who causes all the subsequent beings, and whose possibility of existence is separate from the possibility of non-existence. It is in this passage that Gundissalinus presents the long quotation from *Metaphysica* I, 6–7 that we have just examined. This quotation plays a fundamental role in the continuation of his analysis, since the ontological difference between necessary and possible being is the theoretical basis on which Gundissalinus' universal hylomorphism is founded.

Thus, the focus shifts from the cosmological description to the analysis of creatural being, and the different logical stages that lead from the first creation of matter and form to the first substance, and then to the particularization of that substance into the first, eternal caused beings: the celestial intelligences, the planets and the four elements. These first caused beings – first from an eminently ontological point of view, as from a logical perspective their ontological composition involves more stages²³ – serve as secondary cause in the institution of the creation. After having described the procession of the beings

²¹ Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 54, 38–47.

²² See Nicola Polloni, *Domingo Gundisalvo, filósofo de frontera* (Madrid, 2013), pp. 51–9.

²³ See Nicola Polloni, "Il *De processione mundi* di Gundissalinus: prospettive per un'analisi genetico-dottrinale", *Annali Umanistici*, 1 (2013): 25–38.

from God to the secondary cause, Gundissalinus ends his treatise with a very brief exposition of some arithmological pertinences.²⁴

In this philosophical scheme, the doctrine of the necessary and possible being serves a double aim. On the one hand, through Avicennian theory Gundissalinus states the main ontological difference between God and creation and, at the same time, the proofs there presented are judged by Gundissalinus as fully sufficient for the treatment of the existence and characterization of God. On the other hand, the theory of the necessary and possible being plays a fundamental role in the evaluation of the creatural being: Gundissalinus connects this doctrine to the Gabirolian universal hylomorphism, interpreting the causal transition from the possible being to the necessary being *per aliud* as the actualization of a potential state, characteristic of both matter and form, through their union. In this way, Avicennian ontology is merged into the universal hylomorphism, forming a new theory in which the possible being is that characteristic of both matter and form before their union,²⁵ the necessary being *per aliud* is the being of the hylomorphic compound after the union of matter and form and the necessary being *per se* is the being of God only, first eminent cause of everything.²⁶

It is clear that, from a certain point of view, Gundissalinus is taking Avicenna's theory to its extreme consequences here, directly linking the necessity/possibility of being to the potency/act dialectic, and then to hylomorphic dynamics. However, it is clear that it would have been difficult for Avicenna to plainly admit such an ontological perspective. This is why Gundissalinus often needs to modify some passages of his sources, in order to offer a stronger consistency to his treatise.

Not every passage where we see an alteration has to be considered as a voluntary change introduced by Gundissalinus, and not every alteration voluntarily introduced by the author responds to a theoretical aim. Gundissalinus seems to be keen to improve the elegance of the Latin rendering of the Arabic text he translated, introducing into his quotations some textual changes which, from a theoretical point of view, are quite irrelevant, at least in the present study. We will therefore focus only on the changes that are (a.) deliberately introduced by Gundissalinus (b.) with a theoretical aim.

Gundissalinus presents several quotations in his philosophical works, since the doctrinal adoption he accomplishes of many concepts

²⁴ Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, 55, 6–56, 12.

²⁵ Gundissalinus distinguishes between *materiale esse*, a potential being proper of both matter and form before being joined together, and *formale esse*, an actual being proper of the compound and the ontological components after their reciprocal union acted by their cause.

²⁶ See Polloni, "Il *De processione mundi* di Gundissalinus".

from his source usually corresponds to a direct quotation of the source itself. It is hence possible to define some criteria for the peculiar use Gundissalinus made of his sources, highlighting the main aspects that characterize his *modus operandi*.

A first criterion (1.) concerns the length of these quotations. In his work, Gundissalinus inserts (1.1) a high number of very short quotes, often no longer than a simple phrase, covering at best a period. These brief excerpts could be interconnected to other quotations of the same length, and they are always placed within a very fluent textual ensemble, in which – and this is another typical temper of Gundissalinus – an explicit mention of the original author never appears. Due to this conciseness, the most prominent effect of this procedure is that, by changing the semantic context of a quote, Gundissalinus often modifies its original sense as well.²⁷ However, we cannot say, at least for now, whether or not Gundissalinus was fully aware of the extent of these modifications.

A second class of quotations (1.2) includes excerpts whose text is, approximately, longer than a period but within the limits of a paragraph.²⁸ In this kind of quotations, textual alterations are not sporadic, and seem to be subordinated to a global philosophical rereading of the source used by Gundissalinus, who seems to modify the quoted texts, through a semantic bending, in order to adapt them to his speculative perspective.

The last kind of quotation according to this first criterion (1.3) comprises excerpts much longer than a paragraph, texts that are structured in different conceptual kernels and that may arrive to include whole chapters from the employed sources. Among the more eloquent examples of this approach, one may include the *Summa Avicennae de convenientia et differentia subiectorum*, in the final part of the *De divisione philosophiae*,²⁹ the presentation of the Avicennian doctrine of necessary and possible being in the *De processione mundi* and, more peculiarly, the whole structure of the *De scientiis*.³⁰ The length of these passages often offers a series of textual modifications and meaningful alterations, introduced in different ways by Gundissalinus.

The second aspect we have to point out in order to establish valuable criteria to analyse Gundissalinus' "modus referendi" is (2.) the philosophical range of each quotation. As a matter of fact, as the

²⁷ This is the case of many quotations from Ibn Gabirol's *Fons Vitae* in the *De processione mundi*.

²⁸ An example of this second kind of quotation is the exposition of the causal scheme received by Hermann of Carinthia in *De Processione Mundi*, 19, 21–20, 6.

²⁹ Gundissalinus, *Über die Einteilung der Philosophie*, ed. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner (Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 2007), pp. 236–52.

³⁰ See the introduction to Gundissalinus, *De scientiis*, ed. Manuel Alonso Alonso (Madrid-Granada, 1954), pp. 8–32.

number of direct quotes in Gundissalinian texts is so high, it is possible to distinguish between (2.1) a class of passages that quote a textual passage with an important doctrinal kernel, or a quotation that performs a distinctive role in the treatise's theoretical structure;³¹ (2.2) a group of passages, often very short, that have minor importance on the doctrinal level both in the original and in the derived text;³² and (2.3) those textual passages that are of little relevance in the source text but that play a primary role in Gundissalinus' treatises.³³ The last group is especially important, as it reveals the focus of Gundissalinus' critical perspective.

The last criterion we have to define is (3.) the proper alteration of the text, a phenomenon already highlighted by Hasse.³⁴ Even in this case, it is possible to single out three main categories of textual modifications, namely:

- (3.1) – introduction of new textual material in the quoted excerpt
- (3.2) – elimination of a part of the original text in the passages presented by Gundissalinus
- (3.3) – proper textual alteration, divided into a) lexical and morpho-syntactical alterations, and b) changes to the structural order.

All three kinds of alteration are found in the presentation of the doctrine of necessary and possible being Gundissalinus provides in his *De processione mundi* by means of the long quotation from *Metaphysica* I, 6–7. Regarding the first two criteria we have just presented, it clearly appears that this excerpt is one of the longest quotations (1.3), including two chapters of the first book of Avicenna's work. Moreover, the doctrine of necessary and possible being is of primary importance for both Avicenna and Gundissalinus (2.1). It performs a fundamental task in the economy of Gundissalinus' cosmological treatise, since it proves the existence of God and introduces the ontological difference between first cause and the series of caused beings, the theoretical substrate for the whole exposition of the *De processione mundi*.³⁵

The two versions of the text are very similar to one another, but on closer analysis a large number of discrepancies appears. We will focus

³¹ This is the case, for example, with the *Summa Avicennae de convenientia et differentia subiectorum*, as we have just seen.

³² For example, the Gundissalinian passage in *De processione mundi*, p. 30, 12–14, which is a quotation from Avicenna, *Fons vitae*, ed. Clemens Baeumker (Münster, 1895), p. 260, 12–20.

³³ This is the case, for example, with *De processione mundi*, p. 29, 1–4 directly derived from *Fons vitae*, p. 277, 5–9. This is of great importance in Gundissalinus' treatise, for thanks to his hermeneutics of this passage Gundissalinus distinguishes between the material being and the formal being. See Polloni, "Il *De processione mundi* di Gundissalinus".

³⁴ See Nikolaus D. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London, 2000), pp. 13–18.

³⁵ See Polloni, *Domingo Gundisalvo, filósofo de frontera*.

here only on the most significant instances of Gundissalinus' alteration strategy.

A first aspect clearly revealed by the textual confrontation is Gundissalinus' modification of the order of the arguments. Gundissalinus modifies the structure of the exposition on at least two occasions: the *De processione mundi* presents us with a textual articulation that starts with the analysis of the possible being and then moves on to examine the necessary being, whereas in the *Liber de philosophia prima* we find a reverse order.³⁶ Likewise, the negative attributes of the necessary being have a different position in the text in the first Avicenna translation, that is to say as premise to the treatment of the necessary and possible being, whereas in the *De processione mundi* this passage figures as a conclusion and as a summary of the previous demonstrations.³⁷

In addition to these changes in the order of the exposition, the textual comparison also reveals a high number of textual alterations characterized by the insertion, elimination or the plain modification of passages or words. Often these changes seem to fit the aim of yielding more textual intelligibility, both in exposition and lexicon. Such a need for clarity originates from the significant textual complexity of the original Arabic text and leads Gundissalinus to seek terms that could be clearer and often more precise, and to break the long sentences of the first, literal translation from the Arabic, in order to give more perspicuity to the philosophical reasoning. This is the case with many word modifications aimed at reinforcing the sense of Avicenna's line of reasoning, such as, for example, the change of the connective *vel* with *aut* in order to reinforce the strict necessity of the alternative presented, or the choice of the periphrasis "they equally accompany themselves" (*aequaliter se concomitantur*) instead of "they are equal in the association of being" (*coaequalia in concomitantia essendi*) in the *Metaphysica*.³⁸ Another typical modification of this sort, with some doctrinal implications, is the tendency to substitute *Metaphysica*'s "necesse esse" with the attributive "necessarium

³⁶ Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* I, 43, 21–23, and Gundissalinus, *De Processione Mundi*, 7, 3–8, 4.

³⁷ Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* I, 44, 24–30, and Gundissalinus, *De Processione Mundi*, 16, 23–25.

³⁸ Cf. Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, 8, 5–10: "Dicimus etiam non posse esse, ut id, quod est necesse esse, habeat aliud necesse, ita ut hoc sit simul cum illo et illud cum isto, nec unum illorum sit causa par alterius, sed aequaliter se concomitantur in necessitate essendi. Cum enim consideratum fuerit unumquodque eorum per se sine alio, aut erit necessarium per se, aut non erit necessarium per se"; and Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 46, 72–77: "Dicemus etiam esse impossibile ut ei quod est necesse esse sit compar aliud necesse esse, ita ut hoc simul habeat esse cum illo, et illud simul habeat esse cum isto, nec unum eorum sit causa alterius, sed sint coaequalia in comitantia essendi. Cum enim considerata fuerit essentia uniuscuiusque eorum per se sine alio, non potest esse quin sit vel necessarium per se, vel non necessarium per se".

esse”,³⁹ which seems to respond to Gundissalinus’ focus on the ontological patterns of Avicennian theory.

Nevertheless, this clarification does not always obtain the expected results: Gundissalinus’ choice to change “and it is also impossible that the other one be similar or not similar” (*et impossibile est etiam quin illud aliud vel sit similiter vel non sit similiter*⁴⁰) to “and so it is impossible that the other one be so or not be so” (*et tunc impossibile est, quin illud aliud aut sit sic aut non sit sic*⁴¹) is far from satisfactory, since, in addition to be cacophonous (at least in the Latin text), it is less clear than the former expression, even though its insertion springs from the probable aim to strengthen Avicenna’s argument, by replacing the “similiter” – which implies a likeness between the terms – with “sic”, which conveys a stronger identity for the two beings supposed in this comparison.

These kinds of alterations may also involve a straightforward doctrinal modification. An example of this procedure is provided by the following passage taken from the discussion of the two possible beings, where we read:

Liber de philosophia prima I,
45, 52–58

Si autem id quod est non est sufficiens ad acquirendum sibi utrumlibet, sed per aliquid aliud adiunctum est sibi esse id quod est, tunc esse illius est ex esse alterius a se, quo eget ad esse, et sic illud est causa eius. Igitur habet causam; et omnino non habebit aliquod duorum acquiritorum per seipsum, sed per causam: intentio enim essendi est ex causa quae est causa essendi, et intentio non essendi est ex causa quae est privatio causae intentionis essendi, sicut scisti.

De processione mundi 6, 11–17

Si autem non est sufficiens sibi ad habendum esse per se, sed aliquid aliud est, a quo est esse illius – omne autem, cuius esse est ex esse alterius a se, qui omnia egit ad esse, illud utique est causa eius – tunc possibile prius causam habet et non habebit quodlibet duorum receptorum per se nisi per causam. Intellectus enim essendi est ex eo, quod est causa essendi, et intellectus non essendi est ex causa privante essendi rem

The discrepancy here is not only lexical but also doctrinal: in the original version, the “intention of not being” (*intentio non essendi*) derives from that very cause which is the privation of the cause of the intention of being, following a logic-ontological perspective typical

³⁹ For example, cf. Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, 8, 20–27.

⁴⁰ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima I*, 46, 86–87.

⁴¹ Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, 8, 21–22.

of Avicennian *modus speculandi*. In the Gundissalinian version, however, the definition of not-being derives from a cause that deprives the being of the thing, a supposed negative cause that subsists as a being that deprives other things of their being. It is clear, then, that the two perspectives are different and the textual change is subordinated to a different understanding of the argument.

In other cases, Gundissalinus modifies the text by depriving it of some elements and/or re-elaborating the whole passage in a synthesis of Avicenna's reasoning. An example of this may be seen in the presentation of the second of Avicenna's arguments,⁴² where Gundissalinus provides a synthesis of the premise of Avicenna's demonstration, presenting the results of his reasoning and displaying a clear syntactical restyling.

As we have said, the alterations Gundissalinus introduces are often aimed at a doctrinal sharpening of Avicenna's perspective. Two passages are in my opinion paradigmatic in this regard. The first is related to the first proof of the uniqueness of the necessary being. This argument is based on the impossibility of the essential definition of the necessary being to be manifold.

The first part of this demonstration refers to the sub-hypothesis according to which two necessary beings are supposedly identical in their essential definition. In this case, even though they share the same essential definition, all the same they are separate from one another, so that a differentiating factor must be supposed, such as an accident or an un-essential attribute. At this point, the argument bifurcates into a further alternative concerning the relationship of these supposed accidents with the necessary being. And it is here that Gundissalinus felicitously modifies the text.

Hence, the first possibility of the alternative is linked, both for Avicenna and Gundissalinus, to the eventuality that the diversity between the supposed two beings inheres in their essence in virtue of their very quiddity, that is, thanks to their essence: however, this would mean that what should be the principle of their differentiation is identical for both the supposed necessary beings, and that is contradictory.

⁴² Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 48, 12–17: "Relativorum autem non est necesse unum esse ex altero, sed cum altero. Quod autem facit illa duo esse necessario est causa quae coniungit illa, vel etiam duae materiae, vel duo subiecta de quibus illa praedicantur. Non autem esse duarum materialium vel duorum subiectorum tantum sufficit ad hoc, sed esse tertium quod coniungit illa"; and Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, pp. 9, 20–10, 1: "Relativorum autem alterum non dat esse alteri, sed est simul cum eo; datorum autem esse causa est coniungens illa. Duae etiam materiae vel duae solae substantiae non sufficiunt per se ad conferendum sibi hoc esse, quod dicitur de eis, sed egent alio aliquo tertio, quod componat ea inter se".

With regard to the second possibility of this alternative, we find an interesting discrepancy between the two versions of the text:

Liber de philosophia prima I,
50, 59–69

De processione mundi 12, 1–12

Vel accidunt ex causis extrinsecis, non ex ipsa sua quidditate, et tunc, si non esset causa illa, non differrent. Igitur, si non esset causa illa, essentiae essent una vel non essent una. Igitur, si non esset causa illa, tunc nec hoc per se solum esset necesse esse, nec illud per se solum esset necesse esse; igitur necessitas essendi uniuscuiusque eorum, propria et solitaria, est acquisita ab alio a se. Iam autem dictum est quod quicquid est necessarium esse per aliud a se non est necessarium esse per se, immo in definitione suae essentiae est possibile esse. Unde unumquodque eorum est necessarium esse per se et possibile esse per se, quod est inconueniens.

Vel si accidit eis diversitas ex causis intrinsecis, non causis essentiae addictis, tunc, si causa illa non esset, profecto non differrent. Ergo, si causa illa non esset, essentiae illorum essent una – sed non sunt una; ergo, si causa illa non esset, non haberet unumquodque eorum necessarium esse per se discretum ab alio. Ergo necessitas essendi uniuscuiusque illorum propria et solitaria est ex causa intrinseca. Iam autem ostendimus, quod, quicquid est necessarium esse per aliud, non est necessarium esse per se. Immo in definitione essentiae ipsius est possibile esse, cum unumquodque eorum, sicut est necessarium esse per se, sic etiam est possibile esse per se, quod est inconueniens.

This second alternative is not only different but presumptively opposite in the two versions, as we read “by an extrinsic cause and not by its own quiddity” (*ex causis extrinsecis non ex ipsa sua quidditate*) in the *Metaphysica*’s text, and “by an intrinsic cause not a cause assigned to the essence” (*ex causis intrinsecis non causis essentiae addictis*) in the *De processione mundi*.⁴³

⁴³ This passage, where we find the alteration of *Metaphysics*’ “ex causis extrinsecis” to the *De processione*’s “ex causis intrinsecis”, and the subsequent “acquisita ab alio a se” to “ex causa extrinseca”, is quite problematic. As is known, Bülow chooses the MS Paris, BNF, Lat. 6443 as the main manuscript for his critical edition of the Gundissalinian treatise. At the same time, among the four manuscripts Bülow used for this edition, it should be stressed that the MS Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 2186 often presents a stricter proximity to the original text of the quotations Gundissalinus presents in his treatise. This is probably due to some corrections introduced by the copyist, who may have had some of the sources used by Gundissalinus at his disposal, and in particular Avicenna’s *Metaphysics*. It is therefore not surprising that the MS Lat. 2186 is the only manuscript used by Bülow to report a reading concordant with the Avicennian text, that is, “ex causis extrinsecis”. Furthermore, an identical philological situation can be found with the critical edition by Alonso Del Real and Soto Bruna. Nevertheless, a rapid recension of further manuscript witnesses, unknown

In the *Liber de philosophia prima*, the hypothesis of an external pertinence is directly linked to the previous hypothesis regarding the possibility of an internal pertinence by the quiddity of the necessary being. If we admit an external cause that grants its necessity to that being, said necessity would derive from something other than the supposed being itself, meaning it could not be said to be a *necesse esse per se*.

Rather, a differentiating factor is supposed in the *De processione mundi*, which is developed by a cause inherent to the essence of that necessary being, thanks to which the two beings should differ from one another. This would mean, however, that the necessity of these two beings derives from this same internal cause, so that, regarding the definition of their essence, they are possible beings; this latter scenario is inconsistent, however, as they would be simultaneously possible and necessary beings. Thus, the outcome of the two arguments seems to be the same, even if their course is different.

As a matter of fact, the consequence of the argument presented by the *Metaphysica* is that the pertinence of an external cause is at variance with the premise of the reasoning itself: the two beings were supposed to be necessary *per se* but they are necessary *per aliud*. Gundissalinus' result is minutely different: here, too, the pertinence of a cause involves the two supposed beings being necessary *per aliud*, because they are caused. Indeed, everything that is caused is a possible being whose possibility has been granted by its cause: through this distinction of the possibility of being from that of not-being, as we have seen, the possible being becomes a necessary being but not *per se*: it becomes a *necesse esse per aliud*. In contrast with the *Liber de philosophia prima*, here the cause is presented as internal, and so we might suppose that for Gundissalinus there is a contradiction between the inner necessity of the two beings and the fact that their necessity is caused: they would be simultaneously necessary *per se* and *per aliud*, which is not possible. The two versions

to Bülow, shows that at least the MSS Toledo, BCT 47–15; Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 504; Città del Vaticano, BAV, ottob. Lat. 1870; and Bruxelles, KRB II.2558 share the same version presented by MS Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 2186. This is the only passage examined in this paper where such a philological outcome can be seen: regarding the other changes introduced by Gundissalinus, the manuscript tradition seems to be coherent in presenting the textual alteration analysed, alterations that therefore cannot be ascribed to the material transmission of the text. However, this fact contributes to the claim of a new critical edition of Gundissalinus' *De processione mundi* that takes into consideration the new manuscript witnesses already found for the elaboration of a new *stemma codicum*. Until then, any use of these new witnesses would be improper, since the parental relations between these new versions are still philologically unclear. I will come back to this topic in a further study.

of this argument therefore lead to the same conclusion: the impossibility of two necessary beings.

The last paradigmatic case of Gundissalinus' alteration strategy I would like to underline here belongs to the fourth Avicenna's argument and is directly linked to the definition of the necessity of existence:

Liber de philosophia prima I,
51, 83–52, 97

De processione mundi 13, 6–22

Iam autem notum est quod differentiae non recipiuntur in definitione eius quod ponitur ut genus; igitur ipsae non acquirunt generi certitudinem, sed acquirunt ei esse in actu, sicut rationale. Rationale enim non acquirit animali intentionem animalitatis, sed acquirit ei esse in effectu per successionem essendi proprie.

Oportet igitur ut differentiae necessitatis essendi, si forte sunt aliquae, non acquirant necessitati essendi certitudinem necessitatis essendi, sed acquirant ei esse in effectu, et hoc est absurdum duobus modis. Uno, quod certitudo necessitatis essendi non est nisi impossibilitas non essendi, non sicut certitudo animalitatis quae est intentio praeter necessitatem essendi, et est esse comitans illam et superveniens illi, sicut scisti; unde acquisitio necessitatis necessitati essendi est acquisitio condicionis de certitudine suae necessitatis: iam autem prohibuimus hoc concedi inter differentiam et genus. Alio, quia sequeretur quod certitudo necessitatis essendi ad hoc ut esset in effectu, pendret ex alio dante ei necessitatem.

Scimus autem, quod differentiae non recipiuntur in definitione eius, quod ponitur ut genus. Ergo non dant generi essentiam eius, sed dant ei esse in actu, sicut rationale. Rationale enim non prodest animali, quantum ad animalitatem, sed prodest ei, ut ipsum sit in actu essentia appropriata. Oportet ergo, ut differentiae necessitatis essendi, si forte sint aliquae, non prosint aliquid, quantum ad essentiam necessitatis essendi, nisi ad esse in actu. Hoc autem factum est duobus modis.

Uno quidem propria essentia necessitatis essendi non est nisi incessabilitas essendi; non sicut essentia animalitatis, quae est essentia praeter essentiam incessabilitatis essendi. Esse enim est consequens illam vel superveniens illi, sicut scisti. Ergo differentiae non prosunt necessitati essendi nisi ad id tantum, quod est inter essentiam suae formae. Iam autem prohibuimus hoc inter genus et differentiam alio modo et ad hoc, ut ipsa necessitas essendi habeat esse in actu: oportet, ut pendeat ab alio dante eam.

The question here concerns the possibility of dividing the necessity of being as a genus in its species, and thus supporting a kind of multiplicity. Nevertheless, species are not part of the definition of their

genus, since throughout their existence, species only actualize the genus, *i.e.* they give it its being in act. This principle can be grasped using the example of the relationship between the species of rational beings and its animal genus: in the definition of *animal*, rationality is not included, since not all animals are rational; nevertheless, however, rational animals – like the other animal species – through their existence actualize the genus' existence. For this reason, if there were specifications of the necessity of being, they would not give their genus the necessity of being but its subsistence in act, and that is not possible. In fact, the same definition of necessary being implies, as we have seen, the impossibility of not being as its proper definition, and a lack of difference between essence and existence.

We can detect in this passage the careful approach Gundissalinus adopted in his work. If, stylistically, the text presented in *De processione mundi* is clearer, how Gundissalinus modifies the Avicennian terms *intentio* and *certitudo* with the simpler and univocal “essence” (*essentia*) is very significant: these changes are probably due to the ontological stance the author wanted to emphasize in his treatise, linking the whole demonstration to the other parts of his text. At the same time, it is very representative of his *modus operandi* that Gundissalinus modifies the definition of the necessity of being from the “impossibility of not being” (*impossibilitas non essendi*) to the more ontological “unceasing activity of being” (*incessabilitas essendi*), as well as the subsequent comparison to the *animalitas*,⁴⁴ which is different from the necessity of being in the *Metaphysics* since the *animalitas* is “an intention beyond the necessity of being that accompanies it and that adds to it” (*intentio praeter necessitatem essendi, et est esse comitans illam et superveniens illi*), while in the *De processione* the same difference is expressed by the being of the *animalitas*, that “is subsequent to it or that adds to it” (*est consequens illam vel superveniens illi*).

How can we explain these discrepancies? And what motivates Gundissalinus to conclude this passage by modifying the Avicenna's “whence the acquisition of the necessity by the necessary being is the acquisition of the certainty of its necessity” (*unde acquisitio necessitatis necessitati essendi est acquisitio condicionis de certitudine suae necessitatis*) into “therefore the differences are not useful to the necessity of being except only for what is between its essence and its form” (*ergo differentiae non prosunt necessitati essendi nisi ad id tantum, quod est inter essentiam suae formae*)? As far as the first question is concerned, it seems plausible that Gundissalinus was driven by the

⁴⁴ “Animalitas” is expressing here the possession of a soul in accordance with the logical divisions of the Porphyry's tree.

intention to clarify the passage, as “being subsequent” (*consequens*) implies a strict logical consequence that “being companion” (*comitans*) does not support, bringing the text closer to the specific sense of Avicenna’s line of reasoning.

Regarding the second question, the *Metaphysics* states the indifference of essence and existence for the necessary being, which entails the impossibility of the acquisition of its actual being, since it is implied in its very definition. In the *De processione mundi*, the text is subtly different: it declares that the differences can be useful (*i.e.* they can have an active consequence, *prosunt*) only in relation⁴⁵ to the essence of the necessary being’s form, but in this way those differences would cause the existence of the same essence whose existence is part of its definition: a possibility already previously excluded in the argument. Also here, the textual alteration entails the insertion of new doctrinal elements – in this case, the form of the necessary being and the direct mention of its essence – that are absent from the *Metaphysics* translation: insertions and modifications that reveal Gundissalinus’ understanding and hermeneutics of the text.

CONCLUSIONS

A thorough examination of these passages allows us to draw some conclusive remarks. Firstly, we have to consider whether the doctrinal shifts these changes involve are intentional or not. It seems to me possible to claim that Gundissalinus is not only aware of the theoretical implications of his textual alterations, but that these doctrinal modifications are actively sought in order to provide his cosmological treatise with a coherent philosophical outlook. And for this same reason it is possible to speak of Gundissalinus using a deliberate alteration strategy.

This first remark is directly linked to the question regarding the translation from the Arabic original. It seems implausible to me that the quotation we find in the *De processione mundi* could be derived from a second version of the Latin *Metaphysica*, and this for two reasons. Firstly, because there is no real coherence between the minor lessons of the *Metaphysica*’s *stemma codicum* and those of *De processione*, and thus, from a strictly philological point of view, there is no grounds for such a supposition. Secondly, if it could be

⁴⁵ Although the critical edition by Bülow reads “inter” here, it is possible to suppose a corruption of the text, since the meaning of the text becomes unintelligible and an “inter” is not admissible for a singular entity (the essence of the form of the necessary being). An emendation of the text could be proposed, reading “intra” instead of “inter”; this is not the right place for a critical revision of the text, however. Nevertheless, since both readings imply a direct relation with the essence of the necessary being, I choose to use the paraphrases “to be related” to express both possibilities.

true that the changes introduced by Gundissalinus are aimed at a clearer understanding of the text, at the same time we have seen how the purpose of these alterations also envisages their insertion into the doctrinal system presented in the *De processione mundi*. These remarks, however, do not deny that Gundissalinus may have elaborated these quoted passages translating directly from the original Arabic text: on the contrary, since many modified terms show a stronger proximity to the Arabic text, it seems plausible to claim that Gundissalinus undertook a new reading of the Avicennian text in Arabic, using that text for the drafting of the *De processione mundi*, checking it and choosing the best terms for his purposes. Nevertheless, this would imply that the *De processione mundi* was written in a late period of Gundissalinus' life, once he could have acquired a good knowledge of Arabic, leaving aside the necessity of a collaborator for direct access to the text.

A last remark concerns the philosophical importance of this alteration strategy: its analysis shows how Gundissalinus does not read his sources in a sterile way. On the contrary, the "modus referendi" and the alterations Gundissalinus made in his *De processione mundi* are parts of a textual and doctrinal balance between different sources, which are interpreted, re-elaborated and blended together by Gundissalinus in order to build his own personal philosophical analysis of the cosmogenesis and the ontological composition of creatures.

APPENDIX

Textual comparison between *De processione mundi*, pp. 5, 19–17, 1 and *Metaphysica I*, 6–7

Metaphysica I, 6 pp. 44, 38–46, 71

Quicquid autem possibile est consideratum in se, eius esse et eius non esse utrumque est per causam. Cum enim habuerit esse, tunc iam acquisitum est sibi esse discretum a non esse. Cum vero desierit esse, iam acquisitum est sibi non esse discretum ab esse. Igitur non potest esse quin utrumlibet istorum duorum acquiratur sibi ab alio a se vel non ab alio a se. Si autem acquiritur ab alio a se, tunc illud aliud est causa. Si vero non acquiritur ab alio a se, manifestum est autem quod quicquid post non esse habet esse iam appropriatum est per aliud quod sibi advenit ab alio a se, similiter et in non esse, tunc, ad appropriandum sibi utrumlibet, id quod ipsum est vel est sufficiens vel non sufficiens. Si autem id quod est sufficiens est ad appropriandum sibi utrumlibet illorum duorum, ita ut sit aliquid illorum duorum, tunc illud est necessarium sibi ipsi per se. Iam autem positum erat non esse necesse. Igitur hoc est inconveniens et impossibile. Si autem id quod est non est sufficiens ad acquirendum sibi utrumlibet, sed per aliquid aliud adiunctum est sibi esse id quod est, tunc esse illius est ex esse alterius a se, quo eget ad esse, et sic illud est causa eius. Igitur habet causam; et omnino non habebit aliquod duorum acquisiteorum per seipsum, sed per

De processione mundi, pp. 5, 19–7, 2

Omne autem, quod possibile est esse, cum consideratum fuerit ipsum in se, eius esse et eius non esse utrumque est ex causa. Cum autem fuerit, iam recepit esse divisum a non-esse; cum vero non fuerit, iam habet non-esse divisum ab esse. Et non potest esse, quin utrumque istorum duorum vel habeat ex alio, vel non habeat ex alio. Si autem habuerit ex alio, profecto ipsum erit ex causa.

Quod vero non habeat ex alio, hoc impossibile est esse. Manifestum est enim nullum posse venire ad esse nisi per aliquid aliud, quod habet esse; similiter ad non-esse. Ipsum enim vel est sufficiens per se ad habendum esse vel non est sufficiens. Si autem ipsum per se est sufficiens ad utrumque recipiendum, tunc, cum habuerit esse, erit ens per se et erit necessarium esse. Positum est autem non esse necessarium esse. Simul ergo est necessarium et possibile, quod est contrarium. Si autem non est sufficiens sibi ad habendum esse per se, sed aliquid aliud est, a quo est esse illius – omne autem, cuius esse est ex esse alterius a se, qui omnia egit ad esse, illud utique est causa eius – tunc possibile prius causam habet et non habebit quodlibet duorum receptorum per se nisi per causam. Intellectus enim essendi est ex eo, quod est causa essendi, et intellectus non essendi est ex causa privante essendi rem. Dicimus ergo de intentione essendi possibiliter, quia esse, quod habet, ex causa sua habet et respectu eius. Quamvis enim non

Continued

Metaphysica I, 6 pp. 44, 38–46, 71

causam: intentio enim essendi est ex causa quae est causa essendi, et intentio non essendi est ex causa quae est privatio causae intentionis essendi, sicut scisti.

Dicemus igitur quod oportet illud fieri necessarium esse per causam et respectu eius. Si enim non fuerit necessarium esse existente essentia causae et comparatione eius, erit etiam possibile. Unde potest concedi illud esse et non esse non appropriatum aliquo illorum duorum; et hoc iterum eget ut sit aliquid tertium per quod assignetur ei esse post non esse, vel post esse non esse, cum causa habuerit esse; est ergo illud alia causa, et sic itur in infinitum, et cum hoc non erit ei appropriatum esse nec acquiretur ei esse, et hoc est absurdum, non ob hoc tantum quod causae eunt in infinitum (hoc autem dubium est hic ad removendum), sed ob hoc quod nondum habet per quod approprietur; iam autem positum est illud habere esse. Igitur manifestum est quod quicquid possibile est esse, non habet esse nisi cum necessarium est esse respectu suae causae.

De processione mundi, pp. 5, 19–7, 2

habeat esse, nisi cum sua causa exstiterit, est tamen esse possibile, licet habeat esse vel non esse, nec sit appropriatum alicui illorum duorum. Monstratum est igitur, quod, quicquid est possibile esse, non habet esse, nisi respectu suae causae.

Metaphysica I, 6, p. 44, 24–37

Quod autem necesse esse non habet causam, manifestum est. Si enim necesse esse haberet causam sui esse, profecto eius esse esset per illam. Quicquid autem est cuius esse est per aliquid, cum consideratum fuerit per se, non habebit esse necessarium;

De processione mundi, pp. 7, 3–8, 4

Prima igitur causa non est possibile esse, igitur necesse est esse; unde non habet causam. Quod enim necesse est esse, non habere causam manifestum est. Si enim necessarium esse habeat causam sui esse, profecto eius esse esset per ipsam. Omne autem, cuius esse est per aliud, cum ipsum fuerit

Continued

Metaphysica I, 6, p. 44, 24–37

quicquid autem consideratum per se sine alio non habet esse necessarium, non est necesse esse per se. Unde constat quod, si necesse esse per se haberet causam, profecto non esset necesse esse per se. Manifestum est igitur quod necesse esse non habet causam. Et patet etiam ex hoc quod impossibile est ut aliquid idem sit necesse esse per se et necesse esse per aliud: si enim eius esse esset per aliud, tunc impossibile esset illud inveniri sine illo alio, impossibile igitur esset inveniri necesse esse per se; si enim esset necessarium per se, iam haberet esse, et illud aliud nihil ageret ad illud esse necessarium; quicquid enim est ad cuius esse agit aliud, eius esse non est necessarium per se.

De processione mundi, pp. 7, 3–8, 4

consideratum in se, eius esse non esset necessarium. Quicquid autem consideratum in se sine alio non invenitur habere esse necessarium, illius esse non erit necessarium per se. Unde constat, quod, si necessarium esse per se habet causam, non est necessarium esse per se. Manifestum est igitur, quod necessarium esse non habet causam. Patet quidem ex hoc etiam esse impossibile unam rem habere necessarium esse per se et habere necessarium esse per aliud. Si enim necessitas sui esse est per aliud, tunc impossibile est illud esse sine alio. Impossibile est igitur, ut habeat necessarium esse per se. Si enim fuerit necessarium esse per se, profecto illud aliud non confert ei aliquid ad esse. Omne enim, cui aliquid confert ad esse, illud non est necessarium esse per se. Igitur necesse esse non habet causam.

Metaphysica I, 6, pp. 46, 72–47, 11

Dicimus etiam esse impossibile ut ei quod est necesse esse sit compar aliud necesse esse, ita ut hoc simul habeat esse cum illo, et illud simul habeat esse cum isto, nec unum eorum sit causa alterius, sed sint coequalia in comitantia essendi. Cum enim considerata fuerit essentia uniuscuiusque eorum per se sine alio, non potest esse quin sit vel necessarium per se, vel non necessarium per se.

Si autem fuerit necessarium per se, non potest esse quin vel habeat etiam necessitatem respectu sui cum secundo, et tunc erit illud

De processione mundi, pp. 8, 5–9, 20

Dicimus etiam non posse esse, ut id, quod est necesse esse, habeat aliud necesse, ita ut hoc sit simul cum illo et illud cum isto, nec unum illorum sit causa par alterius, sed aequaliter se concomitantur in necessitate essendi. Cum enim consideratum fuerit unumquodque eorum per se sine alio, aut erit necessarium per se, aut non erit necessarium per se.

Si autem fuerit necessarium per se, aut habebit necessitatem etiam cum alio, cum consideratum fuerit cum alio – et si sic fuerit, tunc hoc erit necessarium per se et necessarium per aliud, et hoc est inconveniens, sicut supra ostendimus – aut non

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Metaphysica I, 6, pp. 46, 72–47, 11

necesse esse per se et necesse esse propter aliud a se, et hoc est frivolum, sicut supra ostendimus, vel non habeat necessitatem propter aliud, ita ut esse eius non debeat sequi ex esse alterius nec comitetur illud, nec esse eius pendeat ex esse alterius, ita ut hoc non habeat esse nisi et alterum habuerit esse.

Si autem non fuerit necessarium per se, oportebit tunc ut, respectu sui, sit possibile esse et, respectu alterius, sit necesse esse, et impossibile est etiam quin illud aliud vel sit similiter vel non sit similiter. Sed si illud aliud fuerit similiter, tunc non potest esse quin necessitas esse huius sit ex illo, cum illud sit in termino possibiliter essendi, vel in termino necessario essendi. Si autem necessitas essendi huius fuerit ex illo cum illud fuerit in termino necessario essendi, et non ex se nec ex tertio contingente, sicut supra diximus, sed ex illo quod est ex ipso et necessitas esse huius fuerit condicione necessitatis essendi illius cum illo quod acquiritur postea ex necessitate essendi, posterioritate essentiali, tunc non acquiretur necessitas essendi ullo modo. Si autem necessitas essendi huius fuerit ex illo cum illud fuerit in termino possibilitatis, tunc necessitas essendi huius erit ex essentia illius, et illo existente in termino possibilitatis acquirente huic necessitatem essendi, nec acquirente ab isto terminum possibilitatis, sed necessitatem. Igitur causa huius erit possibilitas essendi illius, cum hoc non sit

De processione mundi, pp. 8, 5–9, 20

habebit necessitatem cum alio, ita ut esse eius sequatur ad esse alterius et comitetur illud.

Immo esse eius non pendeat ex esse alterius, ita ut hoc non sit, nisi et illud fuerit, et e contrario. Si autem non fuerit necessarium per se, oportet, ut consideratione sui per se sit possibile esse, consideratione vero alterius sit necessarium esse. Et tunc impossibile est, quin illud aliud aut sit sic aut non sit sic. Si autem et illud aliud fuerit sic, tunc impossibile est, quin necessitas huius essendi sit ex illo, cum illud vel est possibile esse vel necessarium esse. Si autem necessitas essendi huius fuerit ex illo, tunc illud est necessarium esse; sed hoc non habuerit necessarium esse per se, nec per tertium aliud aliquid, sicut praediximus, sed per illud, quod versa vice habet necessitatem essendi ab ipso, et necessitas essendi huius ingerit necessitatem essendi illius, quod e contrario habuit esse post necessitatem essendi huius et hoc posteritate essentiali. Tunc hoc non habebit unquam necessarium esse per se ullo modo. Si autem necessitas essendi huius fuerit ex illo, cum illud est possibile esse, tunc necessitas essendi huius erit ex illo existente possibili et dante huic necessitatem essendi nec accipiente ab illo possibilitatem essendi, sed necessitatem. Ergo possibilitas essendi illius erit causa necessitatis huius, et hoc non erit causa possibilitatis illius essendi.

Ergo non erunt concomitantia, cum unumquodque eorum sit causa per se et causatum per se. Deinde etiam contingit aliud, quod, cum possibilitas essendi illius fuerit causa necessitatis essendi huius, tunc esse huius non

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Metaphysica I, 6, pp. 46, 72–47, 11

causa illius; erunt igitur non coequalia, cum unumquodque eorum sit causa per se et causatum per se. Deinde contingit etiam aliud quod, cum possibilitas essendi illius fuerit causa necessitatis essendi istius, tunc esse illius non pendeat ex esse istius, sed ex possibilitate eius. Igitur oportebit ut esse huius sit simul cum non esse illius; iam autem posuimus illa coequalia; tunc hoc est impossibile: igitur non est possibile ut sint coequalia in esse, ita ut non pendeant ex causa extrinseca; sed oportet ut unum eorum sit primum per seipsum et sit ibi causa extrinseca quae faciat utrumque necessario esse, necessitate pendenti inter se, vel faciat necessarium pendere necessitas utriusque.

De processione mundi, pp. 8, 5–9, 20

procedit ex esse eius, sed ex esse illius. Nos autem posuimus illa concomitantia. Ergo non possunt esse concomitantia in esse, nisi forte ambo pendeant ex alia extrinseca causa. Et tunc oportebit, ut aut alterum eorum sit primum per se, aut sit aliquid aliud extrinsecus, quod det eis esse secundum habitudinem essendi, quam habent inter se, et instituat habitudinem inter ea, secundum quam habeant esse.

Metaphysica I, 6, p. 48, 12–38

Relativorum autem non est necesse unum esse ex altero, sed cum altero. Quod autem facit illa duo esse necessario est causa quae coniungit illa, vel etiam duae materiae, vel duo subiecta de quibus illa praedicantur. Non autem esse duarum materiarum vel duorum subiectorum tantum sufficit ad hoc, sed esse tertium quod coniungit illa, et hoc est quoniam non potest esse quin esse et certitudo uniuscuiusque duorum vel sit esse cum alio, et tunc esse eius per se erit non necessarium; igitur erit possibile; itaque erit causatum, et erit sicut diximus, quod causa eius non est comitans illud in esse, et ita causa

De processione mundi, pp. 9, 20–10, 34

Relativorum autem alterum non dat esse alteri, sed est simul cum eo; datorum autem esse causa est coniungens illa. Duae etiam materiae vel duae solae substantiae non sufficiunt per se ad conferendum sibi hoc esse, quod dicitur de eis, sed egent alio aliquo tertio, quod componat ea inter se. Necesse est enim unum istorum duorum esse, scilicet ut vel esse uniuscuiusque horum et certitudo non sit, nisi fuerit cum alio – et ita tunc suum esse per se non ergo erit necessarium, ergo possibile, ergo causatum; unde ipsum et sua causa, sicut diximus, non comitabuntur se in esse, ergo sua causa erit aliqua res alia, quapropter hoc et illud non erunt causa habitudinis, quae est inter illa,

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Metaphysica I, 6, p. 48, 12–38

eius erit aliud, et tunc illud et aliud non erunt causa habitudinis quae est inter illa, sed illud aliud. Vel non sit esse cum alio, igitur hoc esse cum alio erit aliquid noviter adveniens super suum esse proprium et consequens illud, et etiam esse quod est ex parte eius non erit ex comitantia inquantum sunt comitantia, sed ex causa praecedente, si ipsum fuerit causatum. Tunc ergo ipsum esse eius aut erit ex suo comite, non inquantum est comes, sed inquantum est esse sui comitis quod est ei proprium, et ita non erunt comitantia, sed causa et causatum, et comes eius erit etiam causa habitudinis aestimativae inter ea, sicut pater et filius, aut erunt comitantia secundum hoc quod nullum eorum est causa alterius, et habitudo erit necessaria ad esse eorum. Igitur prima causa habitudinis erit res extrinseca, faciens esse duas essentias eorum, sicut scisti, et habitudo erit accidentaliter; unde non erit ibi comitantia nisi per accidens separabile vel inseparabile. Sed hoc est aliud ab eo in quo sumus; habitudo autem quae est per accidens erit causa sine dubio; unde secundum comitantiam erunt utraque causata, et ita nullum eorum est necessarium esse per se.

De processione mundi, pp. 9, 20–10, 34

sed illa alia causa – vel ut non sit necesse esse simul cum alio; et ita hoc simul esse erit quidem accidens inutile ad esse eius proprium. Unde proprium esse eius non erit ex comitantia comitantis, secundum quam est suum comitans, sed ex causa praecedente, si ipsum causatum fuerit. Tunc ergo esse eius aut erit ex comitante, non ex eo, quod est comitans, sed ex proprio esse comitanti. Et ita non erunt comitantia, sed causa et causatum. Et etiam comes eius erit causa putativa putatae habitudinis, quae est inter illa, ut pater et filius. Aut erunt comitantia secundum hoc, quod nullum eorum est causa alterius et habitudo erit necessaria ad esse eorum. Sed propria prima causa habitudinis erit causa extrinseca instituens duas essentias eorum, sicuti scisti, et habitudo erit accidens. Unde non erit illi comitantia, nisi per accidens separabile, vel inseparabile. Hoc autem est praeter propositum; id autem, quod est per accidens, erit ex causa indubitanter. Unde ex parte comitantis erunt duo causata; et ita nullum eorum necessarium est esse per se.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 49, 40–51, 79

Dicemus etiam quod necesse esse debet esse una essentia; sin autem, sint multae, igitur

De processione mundi, pp. 10, 35–13, 2

Dicemus etiam, quod necessarium esse debet esse unum in se. Sin autem sint multa et sit unumquodque eorum

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Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 49, 40–51, 79

unaquaeque earum erit necesse esse; necesse est autem ut unumquodque eorum in certitudine suae essentiae vel non differat ab altero aliquo modo vel differat. Si autem non differt unum ab alio in intellectu suae propriae essentiae, differt autem ab eo per hoc quod hoc non est illud (hoc enim differentia est sine dubio), profecto unum differt ab alio in eo quod est praeter intellectum essentiae. Intellectus enim essentiae quae est in eis non est diversus; sed est adiunctum ei aliquid per quod factum est hoc vel in hoc, vel est adiunctum ei aliquid quod est hoc vel in hoc nec illud est adiunctum alteri, sed est ei adiunctum per quod factum est hoc, vel quod hoc est hoc ipsum; et haec est appropriatio aliqua, scilicet ipsa intentio per quam est inter ea diversitas. Igitur unumquodque eorum differt ab altero per eam, nec differt ab altero in intentione ipsius essentiae, sed per vires rerum quae sunt ipsamet intentio.

Sed coniunctio intentionis sunt accidentia et consequentia non essentialia, et haec consequentia vel accidunt ex certitudine esse rei, inquantum est ipsa certitudo, et tunc oportet ut omnia conveniant in ea. Iam autem posuimus ea differre in illa; igitur conveniunt et differunt in eisdem, quod est inconveniens. Vel accidunt ex causis extrinsecis, non ex ipsa sua quidditate, et tunc, si non esset causa illa, non differrent. Igitur, si non esset causa illa, essentiae essent una vel non essent una. Igitur, si non

De processione mundi, pp. 10, 35–13, 2

necessarium esse: necesse est unumquodque eorum in sua essentia vel non differre ab altero aliquo modo, vel differre. Si autem non differunt unum ab alio intellectu suae essentiae propriae, differt autem unum ab alio in eo, quod unum non est aliud – haec enim differentia est sine dubio: profecto unum differt ab alio per aliquid, quod est praeter intellectum essentiae. Intellectus enim essentiae est in eis non diversus, sed est adiunctum aliquid, per quod factum est hoc, vel est in hoc, per quod hoc factum est hoc, nec illud est ad aliquid iunctum. Est autem adiunctum unicuique aliorum aliquid, per quod hoc factum est hoc, et e contrario, vel quod hoc est hoc, idem aliud. Haec enim idem sunt in essentia, et est in eis alteritas, alia est diversitas: ergo sic teneamus, quod unumquodque eorum sit idem in essentia cum alio et differat ab alio. Dico ergo, quod ea, quae affixa sunt extrinsecus essentiae, sunt de numero accidentium consequentium, non essentialium. Haec autem accidentia consequentia, si accidunt ipsi essentiae ex hoc, quod est ipsa essentia, necesse est tunc, quod omnia conveniunt in eis. Iam autem diximus illa differre in eis: ergo conveniunt et differunt in eisdem, quod est inconveniens. Vel si accidunt eis diversitas ex causis intrinsecis, non causis essentiae addictis, tunc, si causa illa non esset, profecto non differrent. Ergo, si causa illa non esset, essentiae illorum essent una – sed non sunt una –; ergo, si causa illa non esset, non haberet unumquodque eorum necessarium esse per se discretum ab alio. Ergo necessitas essendi uniuscuiusque illorum

esset causa illa, tunc nec hoc per se solum esset necesse esse, nec illud per se solum esset necesse esse; igitur necessitas essendi uniuscuiusque eorum, propria et solitaria, est acquisita ab alio a se. Iam autem dictum est quod quicquid est necessarium esse per aliud a se non est necessarium esse per se, immo in definitione suae essentiae est possibile esse. Unde unumquodque eorum est necessarium esse per se et possibile esse per se, quod est inconueniens.

Ponamus autem illa differre in aliquo inhaerente, postquam conueniunt in intentione essentiae; igitur impossibile est quin illud in quo differunt vel sit eis necessarium ad necessitatem essendi vel non sit. Si autem fuerit necessarium ad necessitatem essendi, manifestum est tunc oportere ut conueniat in eo quicquid est necesse esse. Si autem non est necessarium necessitati essendi, tunc necessitas essendi ab eo sine illo est solitaria necessitas sui esse, illud vero est adueniens ei accidentaliter et adiungitur ei post plenitudinem necessitatis sui esse. Iam autem ostendimus hoc esse absurdum; igitur impossibile est ut differant in aliquo.

propria et solitaria est ex causa intrinseca. Iam autem ostendimus, quod, quicquid est necessarium esse per aliud, non est necessarium esse per se. Immo in definitione essentiae ipsius est possibile esse, cum unumquodque eorum, sicut est necessarium esse per se, sic etiam est possibile esse per se, quod est inconueniens.

Ponamus autem illa differre in aliquo accidente essentiali, postquam conueniunt in intellectu essentiae. Hoc autem, in quo differunt, impossibile est, quin sit vel necessarium ad necessitatem essendi unumquodque, vel non sit. Si autem necessarium fuerit necessitati essendi, necesse est tunc, ut omnia conueniant in eo quicquid est necessarium esse. Si autem non est necessarium esse necessitati essendi, tunc necessitas essendi est discreta ab eo et est necessitas per se. Illud autem essentialiale est accidens affixum extrinsecus et adueniens necessitati post plenitudinem, sive perfectionem necessitatis essendi. Hoc autem iam ostendimus esse absurdum. Igitur in nullo debent differre.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 51, 80–52, 12

Oportet autem ut adhuc addamus super hoc manifestationem alio modo, hoc est quia impossibile est necessitatem essendi dividi in multitudinem, nisi uno duorum modorum; scilicet, aut dividi per differentias, aut per accidentalia. Iam autem notum est quod differentiae non recipiuntur in

De processione mundi, pp. 13, 3–14, 13

Debemus autem hoc adhuc amplius alio modo ostendere. Impossibile enim est necessitatem essendi dividi per multa, nisi uno duorum modorum, scilicet vel sicut res dividuntur per differentias vel sicut dividuntur per accidentia. Scimus autem, quod differentiae non recipiuntur in definitione eius, quod ponitur ut

Continued

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 51, 80–52, 12

definitione eius quod ponitur ut genus; igitur ipsae non acquirunt generi certitudinem, sed acquirunt ei esse in actu, sicut rationale. Rationale enim non acquirit animali intentionem animalitatis, sed acquirit ei esse in effectu per successionem essendi proprie.

Oportet igitur ut differentiae necessitatis essendi, si forte sunt aliquae, non acquirant necessitati essendi certitudinem necessitatis essendi, sed acquirant ei esse in effectu, et hoc est absurdum duobus modis. Uno, quod certitudo necessitatis essendi non est nisi impossibilitas non essendi, non sicut certitudo animalitatis quae est intentio praeter necessitatem essendi, et est esse comitans illam et superveniens illi, sicut scisti; unde acquisitio necessitatis necessitati essendi est acquisitio condicionis de certitudine suae necessitatis: iam autem prohibuimus hoc concedi inter differentiam et genus. Alio, quia sequeretur quod certitudo necessitatis essendi, ad hoc ut esset in effectu, penderet ex alio dante ei necessitatem. Igitur suum esse illius intentionis quae res est necesse esse, esset ex alio; nos autem loquebamur de necesse esse per se; ergo res esset necessarium esse per se et necessarium esse per aliud, quod iam destruximus. Manifestum est igitur quod necessitatem essendi dividi per illa non est sicut dividi genus per differentias. Manifestum est etiam quod intentio quae intelligitur necessitas essendi non potest esse

De processione mundi, pp. 13, 3–14, 13

genus. Ergo non dant generi essentiam eius, sed dant ei esse in actu, sicut rationale. Rationale enim non prodest animali, quantum ad animalitatem, sed prodest ei, ut ipsum sit in actu essentia appropriata. Oportet ergo, ut differentiae necessitatis essendi, si forte sint aliquae, non prosint aliquid, quantum ad essentiam necessitatis essendi, nisi ad esse in actu. Hoc autem factum est duobus modis. Uno quidem propria essentia necessitatis essendi non est nisi incessabilitas essendi; non sicut essentia animalitatis, quae est essentia praeter essentiam incessabilitatis essendi. Esse enim est consequens illam vel superveniens illi, sicut scisti. Ergo differentiae non prosunt necessitati essendi nisi ad id tantum, quod est inter essentiam suae formae. Iam autem prohibuimus hoc inter genus et differentiam alio modo et ad hoc, ut ipsa necessitas essendi habeat esse in actu: oportet, ut pendeat ab alio dante eam. Unde intentio necessitatis, per quam res est necessarium esse, pendeat ex alio. Nos autem loquebamur de necessario esse per se. Ergo res erit necessarium esse per se et necessarium esse per aliud, quod iam destruximus. Manifestum est igitur, quod necessitatem essendi dividi per illa non est, sicut genus dividi per differentias. Manifestum est etiam, quod essentia, cui debetur necessitas essendi, impossibile est aliquid esse generale, quod dividatur per differentias aut per accidentia. Restat ergo, quod sit aliquid speciale. Dicimus autem esse impossibile, quod necessitas essendi sit aliquid speciale praedicamentum de multis.

Continued

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 51, 80–52, 12

intentio generalis quae dividatur per differentias vel per accidentia. Restat igitur ut sit intentio specialis.

Dicimus autem esse impossibile ut eius specialitas praedicetur de multis. Singularia enim cuiuslibet speciei, postquam non sunt diversa in intellectu essentiae, sicut supra docuimus, tunc unum sunt in eo, sed debent esse diversa accidentibus; iam autem ostendimus hoc non posse esse in necessitate essendi.

De processione mundi, pp. 13, 3–14, 13

Singularia enim cuiuslibet speciei, sicut iam docuimus, postquam non sunt diversa in intellectu essentiae, debent esse diversa accidentibus. Iam autem ostendimus nullum accidens posse esse in necessitate essendi.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 52, 12–53, 27

Possum etiam hoc idem ostendere alio modo breviter, sed reducetur ad id quod iam diximus. Dicemus igitur quod necessitas essendi, si fuerit proprietas alicui in quo est, vel ex necessitate ipsa erit in illo proprio, et tunc necessario alterum eorum erit proprietas, et sic impossibile erit illam esse in alio praeter illud: unde oportebit ut sit in illo solo. Aut erit in illo possibiliter, non ex necessitate, et tunc oportebit ut haec res sit non necesse esse per se; iam autem ipsa erat necesse esse per se. Igitur hoc est inconueniens; igitur necessitas essendi non est nisi uni tantum.

Si quis autem dixerit quod eam esse proprietatem huius non prohibet illam esse proprietatem alterius (eam enim esse proprietatem alterius non removet eam debere esse proprietatem huius), dicemus quia per hoc quod dicimus quod necessitas essendi cum assignatur proprie illi rei, in quantum est

De processione mundi, pp. 14, 14–15, 8

Possumus etiam hoc idem alio modo ostendere summatim. Dicimus enim, quod necessitas essendi, cum de aliquo dicitur, in quo est, aut omnino est propria eius, quod non habet esse nisi per eam nec praeter esse, nec alterius, et sic oportet, ut necessitas essendi non habeat nisi unum singulare; aut eam habeat possibiliter aut necessario: unde haec res erit non necessarium esse per se, cum ipsa sit necessarium esse per se, quod est impossibile. Ergo necessitatem essendi non potest habere nisi una res tantum. Si quis autem dixerit, quod, cum haec una res habeat necessitatem essendi, non prohibetur tamen habere eam alia res; vel, cum alia res habuerit eam, non prohibetur tamen haec res habere eam: dicimus, quod nos non loquimur de necessitate essendi modo, in quantum est propria huius, secundum quod est huius sine consideratione alicuius alterius; non enim potest esse, ut haec eadem proprietas sit alterius, sed alia et consimilis et conformis, quae sic debetur ei, sicut et illa huic.

Continued

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 52, 12–53, 27*De processione mundi*, pp. 14, 14–15, 8

illius, non consideratur esse alterius, intelligitur quod non est proprietas alterius ipsamet, sed consimilis eius, quoniam ipsa non debetur nisi illi soli.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 53, 27–54, 43*De processione mundi*, pp. 15, 9-16, 8

Vel dicemus aliter quod postquam unum eorum est necesse esse, tunc vel idem ipsum erit unum tantum: et tunc, quicquid est necesse esse erit idem ipsum et non aliud praeter ipsum; vel ipsum esse necesse esse erit aliud quam ipsum esse ipsum: et tunc coniunctio eius quod est ipsum esse ipsum cum necesse esse vel erit per seipsam vel per causam aliam praeter se et occasionem facientem illud necesse esse. Si autem fuerit per seipsum quod ipsum est necesse esse, erit idem ipsum tunc quicquid est necesse esse. Si vero fuerit per causam et occasionem facientem illud esse necesse esse, tunc de hoc quod ipsum est idem ipsum erit occasio, et proprietatis sui esse solitarii erit causa. Igitur erit causatum, quod est inconveniens. Sed quia necesse esse unum est in nomine, non sicut species sub genere, et unum est numero, non sicut individua sub specie, sed est intentio quae designat illud tantum suo nomine, in cuius esse nihil aliud sibi communicat. Super hoc autem alias adhuc addemus explanationem. Ideo non est multiplex. Hae igitur sunt proprietates quibus appropriatur necesse esse.

Dicimus etiam aliter, quia, si hoc, quod unumquodque eorum est necessarium esse, est id ipsum tunc, quicquid est necessarium esse, est id ipsum et non aliud. Si autem hoc, quod est necessarium esse, non id ipsum est, immo necessarium esse adiunctum est ei, quod est id ipsum esse, profecto hanc coniunctionem aut habet ex se ipso aut ex alio. Si autem habet ex se ipso et ex hoc, quod est necessarium esse, est id ipsum: tunc, quicquid est necessarium esse, est id ipsum. Si autem habet ex alio, tunc habet eam ex causa, quae est alia a se. Ergo hoc, quod est id ipsum, est ex causa, et proprietas essendi, quae est eius solius propria, est ex causa, ergo est causatum. Necessarium autem esse unum est, expers comitantis. Non enim est ut species sub genere et unum sub numero est, non sicut singularia sub specie, sed intellectum sui nominis non habet nisi ipsum tantum. Unde in suo esse non communicat ei aliquid aliud. Hoc autem alias exposituri sumus.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 54, 44–55, 55

Eius autem quod est possibile esse, iam manifesta est ex hoc proprietate, scilicet quia ipsum necessario eget alio quod faciat illud esse in effectum; quicquid enim est possibile esse, respectu sui, semper est possibile esse, sed fortassis accidit ei necessario esse per aliud a se. Istud autem vel accidit ei semper, vel aliquando. Id autem cui aliquando accidit, debet habere materiam cuius esse praecedat illud tempore, sicut iam ostendemus. Sed id cui semper accidit, eius quidditas non est simplex: quod enim habet respectu sui ipsius aliud est ab eo quod habet ab alio a se, et ex his duobus acquiritur ei esse id quod est. Et ideo nihil est quod omnino sit exspoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu sui ipsius, nisi necesse esse.

De processione mundi, p. 16, 9–22

Hae sunt proprietates, quas habet necessarium esse. Iam autem ostendimus proprietatem eius, quod est possibile esse. Proprietas enim eius est, quod non eget alio, per quod habeat esse in actu. Omne autem, quod possibile est esse, cum consideratur per se ipsum, semper est possibile esse. Contingit autem aliquando ipsum necessarium esse per aliud, et quod sic est, aut non habet necessitatem essendi semper, sed aliquotiens, et quod sic est, opus habet materia, quae ipsum praecedit tempore, sicut mox ostendemus, aut necessitatem essendi habet semper et per aliud, et quod sic est, omnino non est simplex. Aliud est enim, quod habet consideratione sui ipsius, et aliud, quod habet ex alio. Id ipsum enim, quod est, habet ex utroque, scilicet ex se et alio; et propter hoc nihil est adeo primum, adeo simplex, quod non habeat aliquid possibilitatis, et potentiae in se ipso nisi necessarium esse tantum.

Metaphysica I, 6, p. 43, 21–23

Quod cum certificaverimus, sequetur quod necesse esse non est relativum nec mutabile nec multiplex nec communicat ei aliquid aliud in suo esse quod est ei proprium.

De processione mundi, pp. 16, 23–17, 1

Constat ergo, quod necesse esse neque est relativum, neque est mutabile, nec multiplex, sed solitarium, cum nihil aliud participat in suo esse, quod est ei proprium; et hoc non est nisi solus deus, qui est prima causa et primum principium omnium, quod unum tantum necesse est intelligi, non duo vel plura.
